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Article 4

DIVORCE WITHOUT FAULT: THE NEXT STEP
A MODEL FOR CHANGE
Charles W. Tenney, Jr.*
A Roman divorced from his wife, being highly blamed by

his friends, who demanded "Was she not chaste?

Was she not

fair? Was she not fruitful?" holding out his shoe asked them

whether it was not new and well made. "Yet," added he,
"none of you can tell where it pinches me."
PLUTARCH, LIVEs

OF ILLUSTRIOUS MEN,

Amelius Paulus.
I. INTRODUCTION
The unchallenged view of the family as a basic and vital institution in the fabric of Western society has generated a continuing
interest in legal questions concerning it. More particularly, an
abiding concern has been manifested over whether and under what
conditions a dissolution of the family unit ought to be permitted.
Historically, we have moved from a period during which such questions were of exclusive ecclesiastical concern to one in which the
civil law and its courts have undertaken the tasks of determining
such issues.' Building upon the approach of its clerical predecessors, civil divorce law in Western countries has retained a basically
fault-oriented approach, premised upon the commission of a specific
"matrimonial offense." More recently, in the United States in particular, this traditional fault-orientation has been leavened by the
introduction of so-called nonfault grounds for divorce, principal
among which is that providing for a divorce to be granted following
a specified period of separation. 2 The law of divorce appears to be
subject to a continuing liberalizing trend of which such non-fault
increments are one manifestation. This paper represents a modest
effort at contributing to the discussion of this trend. It is, however,
not intended as a comprehensive treatment of all facets of divorce,
but only of divorce grounds. Thus, such important matters as
*
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1 Rheinstein, Trends in Marriage and Divorce Laws of Western Countries, 18 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 3 (1953).
2 For a roster of American jurisdictions which currently provide for divorce on this ground, see note 71 infra.
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property and financial arrangements between parting spouses, migratory divorces, and child custody are not here considered.
Recent developments in family law in Nebraska suggest that
there is today a climate of interest in the family into which a discussion of the present state of our divorce law may properly be
introduced. The first such development was the passage in 1965 of
legislation permitting the establishment of conciliation courts;3 the
second is the work of the Marriage and Divorce Revision Committee of the Nebraska Committee on Children and Youth. The work
of this committee has extended over several years and will mature
in the submission to the 1967 session of the Nebraska Legislature of
a series of proposed revisions of the marriage and divorce statutes.
Regardless of the fate of these proposals, they should serve as a
catalyst to discussion of the problems they pose and the solutions
they offer. The same is true with the thoughts advanced herein.
If the public understanding of the nature of divorce is advanced
through them, their purpose has been well served.
II. NEBRASKA LAW
Viewed on a liberal-conservative continuum, present Nebraska
divorce law appears to fall at somewhat beyond midpoint toward
the liberal end of the scale. Divorce is permitted on the grounds of
adultery by either spouse, habitual drunkenness, willful abandonment "without just cause," imprisonment, a husband's neglect to
provide "suitable maintenance" for his wife, utter desertion for
two years, and extreme cruelty.4 Each of these grounds is based on
the concept of fault. In addition to them, the Nebraska statute
provides also for divorce when one of the spouses is "incurably
insane" and has been confined in a hospital or asylum for at least
five years. 5 This insanity ground is the one which is based more on
the principle of marriage breakdown than on fault. Obviously, a
spouse is not "guilty" of becoming insane.
Coupled with the divorce grounds are those traditional defenses which a spouse may raise in answer to a divorce petition:
collusion, condonation and recrimination. 6 Where they are found
3 NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 42-801 to -823 (Supp. 1965).
4 NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-301 (Reissue 1960); extreme cruelty is provided
for in § 42-302 (Reissue 1960).
5 NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-301(7) (Reissue 1960); and see NEB. REV. STAT.
§§ 42-302.01, 42-302.02 (Reissue 1960).
6 Collusion and recrimination are provided for generally by statute:
NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-304 (Reissue 1960); condonation is a judicially
developed defense. See Keller, Terminating A Marriage in Nebraska,
43 NEB. L. REV. 156 (1963). Defenses to a petition for divorce based
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to exist, they constitute a bar to granting the divorce decree. Collusion generally is an agreement between the spouses to seek a
divorce through some "imposition on the court."7 Thus, an agreement that one of the spouses will seek the divorce for a cause
which does not in fact exist, or mutual agreement to suppress relevant facts, or that one of the parties will commit an offense constituting grounds for divorce (commonly, adultery) in order to obtain it, constitutes collusion. In Nebraska collusion bars granting
the divorce where the husband and wife have agreed to withhold
facts to avoid recrimination
or to testify falsely to the existence
8
of grounds for divorce.
Condonation as a defense to a divorce petition is the forgiveness by one spouse of the marital offense committed by the
other. It is conditional, however, upon the subsequent good behavior of the offending spouse. A repetition of the past offense
will revive the wrong condoned.' 0 In Nebraska it appears also that
the repetition must be of an act which would itself constitute
grounds for a divorce."
Recrimination is that defense whereby it is alleged that the
petitioning spouse has himself been guilty of an offense constituting
grounds for a divorce.' 2 The Nebraska statute provides that a
divorce shall not be decreed "where the party complaining shall be
guilty of the same crime or misconduct charged against the respondent."' 3 On its face, the defense would therefore seem to be
limited to those cases in which the petitioner alleging adultery is
himself guilty of adultery, or of extreme cruelty where that ground
is alleged. However, the Nebraska Supreme Court has "expanded"
the defense by requiring that the petition be denied where the conduct of both parties has been such as to furnish grounds for
on the ground of adultery are separately provided for in NEB. REV.
§ 42-336 (Reissue 1960) and include connivance, condonation,
and a limitation of five years within which a spouse may petition after
STAT.

discovery of the "offense charged."
298 (1940).
8 See Keller, supra note 6, at 164 and cases there cited.
9 Madden, supra note 7, at 300.
10 ".. . the rule is that condonation is forgiveness for the past upon condition that the wrong shall not be repeated. It is dependent upon
future conduct, and a repetition of the offense revives the wrong condoned ..... " Gartside v. Gartside, 181 Neb. 46, 49, 146 N.W.2d 777, 779
7 MADDEN, DOMESTIC RELATIONS

(1966).

11 Keller, supra note 6, at 165 and cases there cited.
12 Madden, supra note 7, at 305.
'3 NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-304 (Reissue 1960).
(Emphasis added.)
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divorce, despite the fact that the conduct of one may be grossly
more culpable than that of the other. The offense of which the
respondent may be guilty may thus be one other than that alleged
by the petitioner. 14
Less frequently mentioned as "defenses" to a divorce petition
(but no less determinative of the issue where they are found to
have existed) are situations involving the insanity of the respondent at the time the offense is alleged to have taken place, the
provocation of the offense by the petitioner, and the requirement
of corroboration of the facts alleged in the petition. Although there
are few cases in Nebraska discussing insanity as a defense, it
would appear that it is available where it exists in gross form
(probably to a degree sufficient to constitute a defense to a criminal charge)15 Provocation, also in extreme form, may constitute a
defense to the divorce petition.' 6 Where it exists, however, the
defense is more usually that of recrimination. Corroboration by
"other satisfactory evidence" of the petitioner's allegations is re7
quired in all cases.1
Of the several grounds for divorce in Nebraska, it is apparent
that that of "extreme cruelty, whether practiced by using personal
violence, or by other means"'-8 provides the most flexible standard for judging particular conduct and hence the widest discretion
for the court to grant the petition or not. What constitutes cruelty
19
will depend on the facts and circumstances of the particular case;
misconduct may be sufficient to constitute
a single act of marital
20
extreme cruelty.
Nebraska cases dealing with extreme cruelty are replete with
statements concerning the tendency of the conduct to destroy the
Exactly what this means,
"legitimate objects of matrimony."2'
14 Gradwohl, Janice L., The Doctrine of Recrimination In Nebraska, 37
NE. L. REV. 409 (1958). See also Keller, supra note 6, at 162, 163 and
cases there cited.
15 Keller, supra note 6, at 166 and cases there cited. See also Annot., 19
A.L.R. 2d 144 (1951).
16 See Schalk v. Schalk, 168 Neb. 223, 234, 95 N.W.2d 545, 549 (1959).
17 NEB. REv. STAT. § 42-335 (Reissue 1960).
18 NEB. REv. STAT. § 42-302 (Reissue 1960).
19 Vollbrecht v. Vollbrecht, 178 Neb. 31, 37, 131 N.W.2d 651, 655 (1964).
20 Ross v. Ross, 174 Neb. 795, 119 N.W.2d 495 (1963).
21 See, e.g., Thompson v. Thompson, 176 Neb. 852, 854, 127 N.W.2d 729, 730
(1964); Chipman v. Chipman, 174 Neb. 584, 587, 118 N.W.2d 761, 763
(1962); Waldbaum v. Waldbaum, 171 Neb. 625, 628, 107 N.W.2d 407,
410 (1961); Schalk v. Schalk, 168 Neb. 229, 232, 95 N.W.2d 545, 548
(1959).

28
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however, is not altogether clear. One possibility is that the finding
of cruelty is to be determined by measuring the conduct in question
against this standard. Thus, the Nebraska Supreme Court has said,
"the rule defining extreme cruelty is: 'Any unjustifiable conduct
by either the husband or wife which destroys the legitimate ends
and objects of matrimony constitutes extreme cruelty as defined
in section 42-302. 122 On the other hand, statements may be found
in the cases to support the contention that the destruction of the
legitimate ends and objects of matrimony is a factor in addition to
and independent of conduct which would otherwise constitute extreme cruelty. In other words, conduct which on its face may not
constitute cruelty may nevertheless be found to be such where it
of matrimony. Thus, it was
tends to the destruction of the objects
23
said in Waldbaum v. Waldbaum:
Any unjustifiable conduct on the part of either husband or wife,
which so grievously wounds the mental feelings of the other, or so
utterly destroys the peace of mind of the other, as to seriously impair the bodily health and endanger the life of the other, or such as
utterly destroys the legitimate objects of matrimony, constitutes
"extreme cruelty ... "
While the latter view appears the more supportable (as well as
preferable) one, there is nothing in the statute itself which requires either that cruelty be found only where it has destroyed
the objects of matrimony or where such objects are destroyed notwithstanding the absence of cruel conduct judged independently.
is the more accurate appears
The question of which interpretation
24
so far not to have been considered.
While it is not the purpose of this paper to treat at length the
ramifications of extreme cruelty as a divorce ground, it will be
helpful in understanding the discussion which follows to describe
briefly the events and result in several recent Nebraska cases in
each of which a wife petitioned for divorce on this ground. In
Schalk v. Schalk,25 it appeared that the parties had been married
22
23
24

25

Chipman v. Chipman, 174 Neb. 584, 587, 118 N.W.2d 761, 763 (1962).
171 Neb. 625, 628, 107 N.W.2d 407, 410 (1961). (Emphasis added.)
Further support for the latter view may be gleaned, however, from certain of the language in Gartside v. Gartside, 181 Neb. 46, 48, 146 N.W.2d
777, 779 (1966), viz., "Plaintiff also testified that the conduct of the
defendant ... generally had destroyed the legitimate objects of matrimony and she could not continue living with him." If the plaintiff's
judgment as to whether the ends of matrimony have been destroyed is
accepted, it would then seem that any conduct may have potentially
that effect. Compare Chipman v. Chipman, 174 Neb. 584, 118 N.W.2d
761 (1962).
168 Neb. 229, 95 N.W.2d 545 (1959).
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in 1936; in 1950 they moved to Nebraska City. Prior to that time,
the husband had been a farmer. The Schalks purchased a home in
Nebraska City for which they both were helping to pay. After
their move, Mr. Schalk developed a blood clot on the brain which
disabled him from working. Other problems developed; unpaid
bills accumulated as a result of their straitened finances. Mrs.
Schalk, over her husband's objection, obtained a job to help relieve
the money problem. Her husband said he thought she merely
wanted to get away from him. In time, he "recovered" from the
brain ailment but gradually became impotent. The family relationship deteriorated further. Mr. Schalk became severely critical
of himself and others. In particular, he berated his wife for the
manner in which she disciplined the children. At times when
angry or upset, he would tell his wife that she was "no good" and
would, in the presence of their children or other individuals, call
her vile names. At other times he threatened her, attempted to
choke her, struck her on two occasions, and ordered her out of the
house. On at least one occasion he locked her out. He also accused
his wife of associating with other men. 26
As a result of the accumulation of these problems, "plaintiff
became so nervous, sleepless, and upset with emotional anxiety
that she began taking aspirin, smoking cigarettes, and drinking 2a7
little, but never too much, in an effort to escape her anxiety."
She testified also that she became nervous and afraid as a result of
her husband's threats. Finally, in 1957, Mrs. Schalk departed the
marital household, taking her children with her; in 1958 her husband was ordered to pay support for his family. On these facts, the
trial court denied the petition for divorce. The supreme court reversed, holding that "the evidence overwhelmingly supports plaintiff's contentions and sustains her right to the relief sought by her.
We are convinced that the object of this marriage has been deby defendant's own unexcusable and unstroyed beyond repair
28
justifiable conduct."
In Chipman v. Chipman,29 it appeared that Mr. Chipman, a
veterinarian with offices in a town other than his residence, left
his home for a vacation about eight years prior to the filing of the
petition. He never returned to live at his home. Instead, he rented
a room in the town where he had his veterinary practice. During
20

Id. at 240, 95 N.W.2d at 551.

27

Ibid.

28

Schalk v. Schalk, 168 Neb. 229, 241-42, 95 N.W.2d 545, 533 (1959).
phasis added.)
174 Neb. 584, 118 N.W.2d 761 (1962).

29

(Em-
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the time between his departure and his wife's petition for divorce,
however, Mr. Chipman continued to provide a home for his family.
He bought and delivered the weekly groceries, made repairs and
performed other chores around the home, and visited regularly with
his children. He also took the family on occasional vacations; and
he engaged his sons to work part time on his farm for which work
he paid them. At the trial, one son testified that his mother
worked and that the family was occasionally "short of money."
On these facts the trial court granted the petition. The supreme
court reversed. Although there is considerable language in the
opinion discussing the need for corroboration and the lack of it in
the testimony offered to support a finding of extreme cruelty, the
apparent ground for reversal was the failure of the adduced facts
30
themselves to support a finding of extreme cruelty.
In the third case, Conry v. Conry,31 the parties had been married for about twenty years. Mr. Conry (older than his wife by
twelve years) was a school teacher who, shortly after the marriage
in 1942, obtained a teaching position in Iowa. After about a year,
he left teaching and moved his family onto an Iowa farm which
he worked until 1957. At that time he obtained a teaching position in Nebraska. For the next three years he farmed in Iowa and
taught school in Nebraska, returning on weekends to his farm, a
distance of about eighty miles. In 1961, Mr. Conry secured a new
teaching position in Nebraska and moved to the town in which he
taught.
It appeared that the parties' difficulties commenced in about
1953. Many of them arose over financial matters. In addition, Mrs.
Conry had a cancerous breast removed in 1954. At that time the
couple quarreled and Mr. Conry told his wife that he wished she
had died, that he wanted to be rid of her, and that he wanted a
divorce. He reportedly struck his wife on other occasions during
quarrels.
At the trial, Mrs. Conry offered as corroborative evidence of
the acts of alleged cruelty the testimony of an acquaintance who
had witnessed conversations between the parties in which Mr. Conry had told his wife that he was "very much finished with her";
that he desired a divorce; that if she didn't seek one, he would; that
he was better off without her; and that he wanted his furniture
back. The district court granted the petition; the supreme court
reversed. The corroboration offered was not of evidence of extreme cruelty taking place in Nebraska. Moreover, the court
30 Id. at 587, 118 N.W.2d at 763.
8-

176 Neb. 396, 126 N.W.2d 188 (1964).
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pointed out that, "mere incompatibility of temper is not a ground
for divorce in this state ....
Nor does the fact that the defendant

stated that he could not and would not live with the plaintiff entitle the plaintiff to a divorce." 32

Certainly there is little that is unique in the facts of these
cases or in the application of the law to those facts. Yet considering them even as within the degree of permissible discretion necessary in interpreting the meaning of "extreme cruelty," one is left
with gnawing doubts as to the ultimate justifiability of the result.
How realistic, in other words, is a law which withholds confirmation of the fact that a marriage obviously is dead, as with the
Chipmans? How effective in promoting the marriage relationship
is a law which permits the courts to overlook powerful factors
over which one may have little or no control in determining whether the conduct which results from such factors constitutes the divorce ground of extreme cruelty? How "unexcusable" or "unjustifiable" was Mr. Schalk's conduct under the circumstances? Of what
ultimate value is the law which denies a dissolution of a marriage
in a situation where, although little doubt may be entertained as to
the existence of a progressively worsening relationship which commenced in another state, the events corroborated in the state where
the petition is filed are insufficient by themselves to constitute a
ground for divorce?
Although, as the cases discussed above attest, divorce on
grounds of extreme cruelty is not easy (in an absolute sense) to
obtain, this ground is by far the most popular one in Nebraska.
In 1964, sixty-one per cent and in 1965 sixty per cent of all divorces
granted were on this ground. 33 The writer is advised that the high
percentage of divorces granted on grounds of extreme cruelty results from the relative ease with which the ground may be proved
and from the not infrequent unwillingness of the petitioning spouse
to mention other factors which may supply the true motivation
for the divorce but which are felt to be unnecessarily damaging to
the respondent. Thus, in Ross v. Ross 34 the husband's petition on
32

Id. at 402, 126 N.W.2d at 192, citing Brown v. Brown, 130 Neb. 487, 265
N.W. 556 (1936).

33 NEB. DEP'T OF HEALTH,

STATISTICAL

REPORT -OF THE BUREAu

OF VITAL

STATISTICS 77 (1964); NEB. DEP'T OF HEALTH, STATISTICAL REPORT OF
THE

BuREAu

OF ViTAL STATISTICS 77 (1965), hereinafter cited as Statis-

tical Report. Drunkenness, the second most common ground, accounted
for 27% of all petitions granted in 1965; all other grounds accounted
for the remaining 13% with non-support and desertion accounting for
a majority of that number.
34 Ross v. Ross, 174 Neb. 795, 119 N.W.2d 495 (1963).
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grounds of extreme cruelty was granted where the proof was of a
single act of "misconduct" which probably amounted to adultery.
Finally, mention should also be made of the prevalence in Nebraska (as in other states") of the ex parte divorce; in 1964 and
1965 over eighty-seven per cent of the petitions granted were uncontested. 6 It may be added that a significant number of those few petitions which are contested are done so apparently because of the
failure of the parties and their counsel to agree in advance on such
matters as alimony, property distributions, and child custody.
III. CRITICISM OF PRESENT LAW
Criticism of divorce legislation, and in particular the fault
orientation which characterizes the various statutes in the United
States, is no novelty. Until fairly recently, however, its practical
impact on legislation has been slight. "Reform" usually has consisted of no more than tinkering with procedural requisites, or
with matters involving alimony or property settlements.3 7 Where
consideration has been given to the grounds for divorce themselves,
it has resulted usually in simply adding to them. It is noteworthy
that the two most significant events in divorce legislation in this
century have been the passage of a divorce statute in South Carolina in 1949, where previously divorce was not permitted at all,3 8
and the adoption of a revised statute in New York in 1966 which
added five new grounds to the previously exclusive one of adultery.3 9
Divorce law today has been labelled a "mockery" 40 tending to
"demean and abase human relations." 41 Specific grounds for divorce are seen as "artificial," 42 "unrealistic,"4 3 and never really
35 O'GomxAN,
36
37

8

LAWYERS AND MATRIMONI AL CASES

22 (1963).

Statistical Report, 1964 and 1965, supra note 33.
For an interesting speculation that one reason for this circumstance
is the superior organization of the forces of conservatism permitting
those forces to dominate a democratic legislature, see Rheinstein,
Trends in Marriage and Divorce Laws of Western Countries, 18 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROB. 18 (1953).
S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-101 (1962).

39 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 170 (McKinney Session Laws 1966).
40 W. FRIEDMAN, LAW IN A CHANGING SocIETY 223 (1959).

Mead, Anthropologist's Views. .. , in "Divorce and Domestic Relations
-A Compilation," 2 VA. L. WEEKLY DICTA COMP. 1, 7 (1949).
42 CARvER, Divorce: Statutory Abolition of Marital Fault, 35 CALIF. L.
REv. 99, 108 (1947).
48 O'GORMAN, LAWYERS AND MATRIMONIAL CASES 27 (1963).
41
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"quite right"; 44 facts alleged in support of them tend often to be

"trivial or fictitious. ' 45 Instead of appearing as an index to the actual reasons for family breakups, they are viewed as "legal fictions," 46 often no more than symptomatic of marital disruption and
usually merely the excuse for ending a meaningless marriage.4 7 As
a result of this unreality in divorce grounds, the divorce process,
while remaining
adversary in theory and in form, devolves into a
"sham battle," 48 a "silly comic melodrama" 49 which, because of its
emphasis on technicalities dealing with effects rather than causes,
breeds the "suppression of truth."50 In sum, fault-based divorce
procedure which "unrealistically purports to reward virtue and
punish sin while ignoring the actual consequences to the family
and society" 5' has been rendered a socially ineffective, "tragically
52
imperfect remedy."
Similar criticism is made of the defenses of connivance, collusion, condonation, and recrimination.53 Not only are they harmful
in themselves in that they also fail to reflect the realities of the
marital relationship, but they require the spouses to conduct themselves as adversaries, both during the marriage and in the divorce
proceedings. 54 Condonation, the conditional forgiveness of a marital "wrong," has the effect of forcing the parties apart if they' wish
to avoid the defense. 5 Recrimination also is seen as "patently un44

Redmount, Analysis of Marriage Trends and Divorce Policies, 10

VAMn.

L. REV. 513, 544 (1957).
45 Sayre, Divorce for the Unworthy: Specific Grounds for Divorce, 18
LAw & CONEMp. PROB. 26, 27 (1953).
46 Elliott, Divorce Legislation and Family Instability, 272 Annals 134, 140
(1950).
47 Editorial, Suggest New Basis for Divorce, 83 CHusTmu CENTURY 1023
(1966).
48

Alexander, Let's Get the Embattled Spouses out of the Trenches, 18
LAW & CoNT'AWp. PROB. 98, 101 (1953) and see Cantor, The Right of
Divorce, 218 ATLANTIc MoNTHLy 67, 71 (1966).

49 VRTUE, FAILY CASES iN COURT 230 (1956).

50 Gradwohl, Janice L., The Doctrine of Recrimination in Nebraska, 37
NEB. L. REV. 409, 438 (1958).

51 Foster, Conciliation and Counseling in the Courts in Family Law Cases,
41 N.Y.U.L.REv. 353, 381 (1966).
52

Alexander, The Follies of Divorce: A Therapeutic Approach to the
Problem, 36 A.B.A.J. 105, 107 (1950); Bradway, The Myth of the
Innocent Spouse, 11 TUL.L. REV. 377, 383 (1937).

53 Keller, Terminating a Marriage in Nebraska, 43 NEB. L. REV. 156 (1963).
54 Johnson, Suppressed, Delayed, Damaging and Avoided Divorces, 18
LAW & CoN Ein'. PROB. 72, 79 (1953).

55 Ibid.

34
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realistic," 50 an "absurd foisting on divorce actions of a rule devel57
oped for different purposes and wholly ill-adapted to divorce.1
It has been suggested that this defense be abolished altogether
and that where mutual guilt is demonstrated it result in an award
of divorce to both parties rather than neither.5 8 Although the presence of one or another of the defenses may cast light on the extent of actual family deterioration, it is felt that they should not be
used to perpetuate meaningless relationships.59
In contrast to critics of present law who see it as irrelevant
and unrealistic and as therefore objectionable on that basis alone,
are those who view current legislation as impotent to stem the
rising tide of divorce. Although one may arrive at varying conclusions as to the actual incidence of divorce in the United States, depending on which criteria are used, it is apparent that the divorce
rate is rising and has (with occasional dips such as during the Depression years) continued to rise steadily since the commencement
of this century. 0 Today the United States has the highest rate of
divorce of any nation of parallel culture and development in the
world.61 In view of these facts, our divorce laws are seen as in
need of "tightening up"; 6 2 divorce is too easily granted, if not in one
state then certainly in another.0 " Divorce is seen as symptomatic
56 BLAKE, THE ROAD TO RENO

237 (1962).

57 Johnson, supra note 54.

58 Gradwohl, supra note 50, at 438. For a recent vivid example of the
frustration created by the recrimination defense, see Fish v. Fish, 4
Mich. Ct. App. 104, 143 N.W.2d 777 (1966) wherein the trial court,
in denying the divorce petition because of the recrimination proved,
felt nevertheless constrained to conclude that "these parties should not
only be separated but should be compelled to live in different states
but that doesn't make any difference, my opinion doesn't count for
anything in this situation." Ibid.
59 PLOSCowE, THE TRUTH ABOUT DIVORCE 258 (1955).
60 JACOBSON, AMERICAN MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 90 (1959); BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, U. S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES, Table No. 49, p. 52 (1963). A rising divorce rate is not neces-

sarily a permanent phenomenon. It has been suggested that it may
stabilize or even drop a bit by the middle of the next decade. Goode,
Family Disorganization, in CONTEIPORARY SOCIAL PROBLEMS, 415
(Merton & Nisbet, eds. 1961).
01 Pfaff, Family Law and Marital Reconciliation Procedures in Europe 6,
ABA, Family Law Section, Monograph No. 3, March, 1966.
02 Burgess, Predictive Methods and Family Stability, 272 Annals 47 (1950);
cf.,
Alexander, supra note 52, at 169.
03 Migratory divorce, federalism's major contribution to family law, often
is the focus of attempts to discourage divorce and/or promote the ef-

fectiveness of a state's own laws. Thus, the Uniform Divorce Recognition Act [NEB, REV, STAT., § 42-341 (Reissue 1960)] provides that
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of the disintegration of the family as an institution,6 4 productive of
emotional disturbance and delinquency, 5 and a costly drain on
the public treasury of funds required to support dependent wives
and children whose principal source of support has vanished.66
Proposals for divorce law reform vary, depending on which
view one takes of the problem. For those who consider it as one of
disparity between the idea and the reality of marriage and divorce,
the suggested change usually is one of the following: 1) the addition of a provision for granting a divorce following a stated period
of separation; 67 2) the abolition altogether of all grounds for divorce
and the substitution therefor of a concept of "marriage breakdown"; 68 or 3) the substitution of divorce by consent of the parties.69 None of these proposals is, of course, entirely discrete from
a foreign divorce shall be of no force and effect in the state if both
spouses were domiciled in the state at the time the proceeding was

commenced.

64
65

66

67

68

69

Lawyers also are adjured to work toward the preservation of family units now being dissolved in large numbers. Ogburn, The Role
of Legal Services in Family Stability, 272 Annals 127, 131 (1950).
Alexander, supra note 52, passim.
Bodenheimer, The Utah Marriage Counseling Experiment: An Account
of Changes in Divorce Law and Procedure,7 UTAH L. REv. 443 (1961);
Furlong, Dual Divorce Decrees and Conciliationin Contemporary Family Law, 2 Wi.LLAIzETTE L. J. 134, 137 (1962); Ralls, The King County
Family Court, 28 WASH. L. REv. 22, 27 (1953).
Bodenheimer, supra note 65. It has been estimated that nearly 80%
of divorced mothers have been forced to turn to outside employment
to adequately provide for themselves and their children. Ralls, supra
note 65.
Foster, An "Honest Ground" for Divorce in Pennsylvania, 34 PA. BAR
A. Q. 646, 649 (1963); McCurdy, Divorce-A Suggested Approach with
ParticularReference to Dissolution for Living Separate and Apart, 9
Vmum. L. REV. 685 (1956); Ploscowe, supra note 59, at 261; Wadlington,
Divorce without Fault without Perjury, 52 VA. L. REV. 32, 68 (1966);
Walher, Our Present Divorce Muddle: A Suggested Solution, 35 A.B.
A.J. 457 (1949).
Bradway, Family Dissolution-Limits of the Present Litigations Method, 20 IowA L. REV. 256 (1943); Ploscowe, supra note 59, at 256 (Professor Ploscowe advocates granting a divorce either because of marital
disruption or following a period of separation); Sayre, Divorce for the
Unworthy: Specific Grounds for Divorce, 18 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.
26 (1953); VIRTUE, FAmILY CASES IN COURT (1956).
Cantor, The Right of Divorce, 218 ATLA-TIc MONTHLY 67 (1966); Carver,
Divorce: Statutory Abolition of Marital Fault, 35 CALM. L. REV. 99
(1947); Lasch, Divorce and the Family in America, 218 ATLAxTic
MONTHLY 57 (1966); Redmount, Analysis of Marriage Trends and Divorce Policies, 10 VAND. L. REv. 513 (1957); Silving, Divorce without
Fault, 29 IowA L. REv. 527 (1944). Divorce by consent is, of course,
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the others. The separation provision is premised on the belief that
remaining apart for the specified time is conclusive evidence of the
fact of "marriage breakdown." It is, furthermore, not without its
element of consent. Indeed, the decision to separate in order to
achieve this ground may be evidenced by a bilateral agreement
between the spouses.70 Moreover, the suggestion to add a separation provision usually implies placing it in the context of the typical fault-oriented statute. It thus becomes an additional "ground"
for awarding a divorce.
Twenty-two states, together with Puerto Rico and the District
of Columbia, now provide for divorce on the ground of living separate and apart without cohabitation for periods ranging from two
to ten years.7'1 Five states require a two year separation,72 five
require five years, 73 and eight states require three years.7 4 Only
one state, Rhode Island, requires the period of separation to be for
ten years. Although these separation statutes are for the most
part silent with respect to the condition of the marriage during and
at the termination of the period of separation, occasional language
may be found requiring further demonstration that the separation
is "beyond any reasonable expectation of reconciliation,"7 5 or that
the "resumption of marital relations is not reasonably probable. 7 6
neither a novel nor unique approach to marriage dissolution. See, e.g.,
Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws (Haffner ed., 1949) 260, 261.
70 See, e.g., N. Y. Dom. REL. LAw § 170(6) (McKinney Session Laws 1966)
which provides for granting a divorce following a two year period of
separation evidenced by the parties' filing of a written agreement of
separation with the clerk of the county wherein either party resides.
71 ALA. CODE, tit. 34, § 22(1) (1958); ARiz. REV. STAT. Am. § 25-312 (West,
1956); Asic. STAT. ANN. § 34-1202 (Bobbs-Merrill, Replacement, 1962);
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46-1-1(J) (Supp. 1960); DEL. CODE ANN., tit.
13, § 1522(11) (1957); D. C. CODE ANN. § 16-403 (1961); IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 32-610 (1947); KY. REV. STAT. § 403.020(1)(b) (1955); LA. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 9-301 (1950); MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 24(5) (1957);
MiVNN. STAT. ANN.§ 518.06(8) (1958); NEV. REV. STAT. § 125.010 (1957);
N. H. REV. STAT.ANN.§ 458.7 (Supp.1957); N. Y. DoM. Ri. LAW § 170
(McKinney Session Laws 1966); N. C. GEN. STAT. § 50-6 (1950); N. D.
CENT. CODE § 14-06-5 (1943); P. R. LAWS ANN., tit. 31, § 321(9) (1955);
R. I.GEN. LAWS ANN.§ 15-5-3 (1956); TEx.REV. Civ. STAT., art. 4629(4)
(1958); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-1 (8) (Supp. 1963); VT. STAT. ANN.,
tit. 15, § 551 (1958); WAsH.REV. CODE ANN. § 247.07(6) (Supp. 1965);
Wyo. STAT. ANN.§ 20-47 (1957).
72 Louisiana, Minnesota, New York, North Carolina and Wyoming.
73 Arizona, Idaho, Kentucky, Washington and Wisconsin.
74 Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Maryland, Nevada, New Hampshire,
Utah and Vermont.
75 DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 13, § 1522(11)
(1957); see also, MD. ANN. CODE,
art. 16, § 24(5) (1957). Cf., N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-06-5 (1943).
76 VT. STAT. ANN., tit. 15, § 551 (1948).
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Although a number of writers have suggested it as a substitution for present fault statutes, the concept of marriage breakdown
has so far failed completely to gain legislative recognition in the
United States. While the concept of incompatibility might on its
face appear to be a substantially similar approach, 77 the history of
the few statutes which codify this ground indicates that its application is liberally larded with the concept of fault.78 Divorce based
on consent of the parties without a confirmatory period of separation has likewise failed in this country (as well as most of the
rest of the world)79 to achieve any significant degree of acceptance among scholars, and has received none from the several state
legislatures.
Where the divorce problem is seen as indicative of the deterioration of the family as an institution and/or as one productive of
more problems than it solves, the leading proposal for legal reform
has been the addition of conciliation parts to the divorce courts.8 0
Such services are seen as means of decreasing the number of divorces through use usually of voluntary procedures designed to relieve at least the immediate causes of marital conflict. Although
reports of experience in some courts having a conciliation part indicate that these good offices are sometimes used by couples neither
of whom had yet petitioned for a divorce, more commonly they are
employed only after a petition has been filed. It is worth noting
here that the petition filed usually alleges one or another of the
"matrimonial offenses" provided as grounds in the particular statute.
Despite impressive scholarly and judicial support for the institution of conciliation facilities, they exist presently in varying
See, e.g., Cantor, supra note 69, at 68: "The simple but apparently unappreciated fact that marriages succeed or fail on the question of
compatibility should make it clear that incompatibility is the only
logical ground for divorce ......
78 Wadlington, supra note 67, at 44. See also Rutman, Departure from
Fault, 1 J. FAMImY LAw 181 (1961). Divorce on grounds of incompatibility is presently permitted in only three states (New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Alaska) and the Virgin Islands. ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.110
(5) (c) (1935); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-7-1 (1953); OKLA. STAT. ANN.,
tit. 12, § 1271 (1953); V.I. CoDE, tit. 16, § 104(a)8 (1964).
79 Japan is today the principal nation in which divorce by consent is
explicitly provided. See WATANABE (wTH MAX RnsrNsTN), The Family and the Law: The Individualistic Premise and Modern Japanese
Family Law, in LAw IN JAPAN: THE LEGAL ORDER IN A CHANGING SOcirv 364 (Von Mehren ed., 1963).
80 See Foster, Conciliation and Counseling in the Courts in Family Law
Cases, 41 N.Y.U.L. REV. 353 (1966); McIntyre, Conciliation of Disrupted
Marriagesby or Through the Judiciary, 4 J. FAmImy LAw 117 (1964).
77
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forms in only about fifteen states.8 1 Although Michigan, California and Wisconsin have long had such provisions, it was not until
following the conclusion of World War II (and very probably as a
result of the temporary rise in the number of divorces following
the war) that they began to receive more widespread attention.
Despite its growing popularity, the success of conciliation in its
present context remains today a matter of speculation and some
doubt. A satisfactory analysis of its effectiveness has yet to be
conducted. 82 Periodic followups of couples "reconciled" are some
indicia of success; yet it is not known (or stated) the number of
these couples for whom the entire procedure of divorce petition
and reconciliation were merely pleas for outside intervention in the
first place. 83 It is probable that a significant number of such
cases do occur.84 Furthermore, conciliation efforts may reach
only
85
a small proportion of the total number of divorce litigants.
Both the theory of fault elimination and the advent of conciliation services spring from a common and uncontroverted public interest in the family, and in a public policy aimed at aiding it to
flourish. 8 6 They do, however, reflect contrasting attitudes as to ex81 McIntyre, supra note 80, at 118.
82

Id. at 131.

Shipman reports that although the first marriage counseling

departments were established in Milwaukee, Wisconsin and Cincinnati,
Ohio in 1933, the history of their services has never been written and an
investigation of their effectiveness has never been conducted. Shipman, A Proposal for Revising MarriageLicense Procedure,27 J. MARRIAGE & FAMiLY 281, 282 (1965).
In a study of the New Jersey experience with two specially appointed masters to hold reconciliation conferences throughout the state,
it was reported that only 2.7% of the 2,293 cases heard over a thirty
month period were reconciled. [1960] REPORT OF THE NE W JERSEY SuPREME COURT'S COMMITTEE ON RECONCILIATION.
88

84

Ralls, The King County Family Court, 28 WASH. L. REv. 22, 26 (1953);
Alexander, The Family Court-An Obstacle Race?, 19 U. PITT. L. REV.
602 (1958).
See Johnstone, Divorce Dismissals: A Field Study, 1 KAN. L. R.v. 245
(1953). Divorce lawyers not uncommonly are consulted by a husband
or wife who has no real intention of filing for or obtaining a divorce.
O'GoRmAN, LAWYERS AND MATRIMONIAL CASES 97 (1963).

85 Foster, Conciliationand Counseling in the Courts in Family Law Cases,
41 N.Y.U.L. REV. 353, 366, 377 (1966).
86 The public's interest in the family and hence with questions concerning
its dissolution has been no better stated than by Mr. Justice Traynor,
speaking for the majority in DeBurgh v. DeBurgh, 39 Cal. 2d 858, 86364, 250 P.2d 598, 601 (1952): "The family is the basic unit of our
society, the center of the personal affections that ennoble and enrich
human life. It channels biological drives that might otherwise become socially destructive; it ensures the care and education of children
in a stable environment; it establishes continuity from one generation
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actly the nature and extent of this public interest and hence what
approaches should be emloyed in implementing it. On the one
hand, the theory of fault elimination is grounded in the belief that
the public's interest is in preserving only those marriages which
may be characterized generally as "going concerns," that to do otherwise may often work more harm than good, and that the viability
of a marriage is not and cannot be gauged in terms of isolated
events to which different individuals react differently. The cause
of conciliation, on the other hand, appears to be premised on the
conviction that divorce is destructive, that the public interest is
therefore in the preservation of the family unit whenever it is at
all possible to do so, and that ameliorative efforts even in the face
of existing grounds and in the context of a fault-oriented, adversary divorce process will be efficient to this end. Each of these
strategies tends to exist independently of the other. Both have
sufficient basis in reality to commend them to the consideration
of divorce law "improvers." Yet each is elliptical to the extent
that considerations in favor of the other predominate. To that extent their co-existence represents a point of potential conflict in
public policy towards divorce. Thus, voluntary separation for a
period of months or years reflects the view that where such a
condition exists, it is improbable that the marriage can or should
be continued. Reconciliation, on the other hand, undertakes to revitalize such a marriage if it appears at all possible. Yet where
time,
the parties have been separated for any appreciable length 8of
7
the prospects of effecting a reconciliation appear rather dim.
Moreover, where both conciliation and fault grounds exist under the same judicial roof, it seems confusing to the spouse to be
told on the one hand that she has grounds for divorce, and on the
other that she ought to attempt to maintain the marriage. In
other words, grounds are not so important that further effort to
preserve the marriage should not be attempted; but grounds are
the only method whereby one can dissolve the marriage.8 8 Furto another; it nurtures and develops the individual initiative that distinguishes a free people. Since the family is the core of our society,
the law seeks to foster and preserve marriage. But when a marriage
has failed and the family has ceased to be a unit, the purposes of
family life are no longer served and divorce will be permitted."
87 This was the conclusion of the New Jersey Supreme Court Committee
on Reconciliation. See note 82 supra.
88 Foster reports that the reconciliation practice in the Milwaukee County
Family Court is to avoid specific allegations of misconduct in a complaint for divorce in an attempt to eliminate the impediment to reconciliation which results from "incendiary divorce pleadings." Foster,
supra note 85, at 359.
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thermore, we in essence forestall resort to the court at an earlier
(and presumably more hopeful) stage by specifying grounds as
one's ticket to court. Of course, grounds as such may accrue at
any time during the marriage. As a practical matter, however,
grounds which occur early in a marriage are often overlooked
(condoned) and most grounds are the culmination of a period of
deterioration in the marriage relationship which extends over
months or even years.8 9 For this reason, court-based conciliation
efforts are seen as offering "too little, too late."'90
From an analysis of the literature, it is apparent that both
views of our present situation with respect to divorce have much
to commend them. Indeed, they stand in relationship to one another not so much as contradictions as examples of special pleading based on elliptical premises. There is no doubt that our divorce
rate is high and that we ought to bend every reasonable effort
toward reducing it, or at least preventing it from rising even
higher. On the other hand, a significant factor in causing this
rate may be the unrealistic approach which our divorce law takes
toward the matrimonial condition; unrealistic law may, in other
words, actually be conducive of divorce in some cases.
If this analysis is accurate and if it is agreed that both conciliation and non-fault approaches to marital dissolution possess
kernels of quality worth preserving, and if it is agreed also that
these two phenomena existing independently of one another pose
contrasting and at times conflictual policies with respect to dissolution, it would seem worthwhile to undertake some means whereby
the best of both policies might be melded into one coherent whole.
Such a system would at once recognize on the one hand the virtual
impossibility of specifying in advance all of the factors which are
and should be recognized as affecting the viability of a marriage;
and on the other hand, it would reflect the public policy of encouraging maintenance of the marriage whenever it appears reasonably possible to do so. And if we could at the same time
accomplish some diminution in the ill will, trauma, and hardship
which so often accompany the divorce granted today, we would be
well on the road to nirvana. The challenge to do so is a tantalizing
one.

89 Goode estimates the average "deterioration" period at about two years.

Goode, Family Disorganization, in

CONTEMPOaARY SOCIAL PROBLEMS

445 (Merton & Nisbet, eds. 1961).
90 Compare Johnstone, supra note 84, at 255.
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IV. AN INTEGRATIVE APPROACH TO MARITAL
PROBLEM SOLVING
It is submitted that such a system is a practical possibility.
Its core would be the elimination of all of the current categorical
grounds for divorce, both "fault" and "non-fault," and the substitution therefor of a judicial determination simply of whether, considering all relevant facts and circumstances, the marriage ought
to be dissolved. Such a proposal was made by the writer to the
Marriage and Divorce Revision Committee of the Nebraska Committee on Children and Youth. Although the proposal was favorably received by the Revision Committee members, it will not appear as part of the package of proposed amendments to Nebraska
law which that group will submit to the 1967 session of the state
legislature. It was agreed, however, that the proposal merited further public dissemination and comment. This paper represents an
effort to further these ends. To promote an understanding of the
discussion which follows, the complete text of the proposal is herein set out:
DIVORCE
1. A petition for absolute divorce may be filed by either or
both spouses to a marriage. The petition shall allege that the condition of the marriage is such that it ought to be dissolved. No
further pleadings shall be required.
2. Upon the filing of a petition, the court may cause an investigation to be made into the facts and circumstances of the marriage and the condition of the family and a report thereon to be
furnished the court. The court may in its discretion request the
parties to submit to psychiatric, psychological, social, or physical
examination as part of such investigation and may adjourn the proceedings from time to time for these purposes. The court may order the use of court-connected conciliation facilities, where available, for investigative purposes.
Reports furnished the court pursuant to this section shall be
deemed confidential communications and no disclosure thereof or of
information on which such reports are based shall be made to any
person or agency, other than the court, save with the express consent of the court and the parties to the proceeding; provided, however, that the court may in its discretion disclose the nature or
contents of such report or information to the parties or either of
them, and to their counsel.
3. Following an investigation conducted pursuant to § 2 above,
and after hearing, a decree of dissolution shall be granted the
spouses, or either of them, where there is substantial evidence that,
by virtue of deep-seated and irretrievable disruption of the matrimonial relationship a restitution of a community of life corresponding to the nature of marriage cannot reasonably be expected. In
making its determination the court shall consider, where applicable,
the following together with all other relevant factors:
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a) The degree of physical and emotional compatibility existing
between the spouses;
b) The present physical separation of the spouses, regardless
of the length of such separation or the reasons therefor;
c) The physical and emotional health of any minor children
residing in the marital household;
d) Habitual intemperance or use of narcotic drugs on the
part of either spouse;
e) Repeated acts of physical or emotional cruelty sufficient
to constitute a course of conduct by either spouse;
f) The mental illness of either spouse;
g) Prolonged physical illness of either spouse;
h) The length of the marriage;
i) The number and ages of children of the marriage and
their emotional relationship to each spouse;
j) Relationships between either spouse and third parties;
k) Prior efforts at reconciliation by either or both spouses;
1) Other factors of like nature to those enumerated in (a) to
(k) above and which appear relevant in determining the viability of
the marriage.
Hearings conducted pursuant to this section shall be closed to all
persons except the parties to the proceeding, members of their
families, their counsel, and such other individuals as may to the
court appear appropriate, considering the nature of the proceeding.
4. If, after investigation and hearing conducted pursuant to
§§ 2 and 3 above, the court determines that the marriage should
not be dissolved, it may in its discretion nevertheless recommend
that the parties, or either of them, undertake, either at their own
or the public expense, such counseling, medical or other treatment
as may appear necessary to strengthen and reinforce the marriage
and family relationship so as to prevent its further deterioration, or
its dissolution.
5. The provisions of §§ 1 through 4 shall be construed to the
end that the marriage relationship shall be preserved whenever it
appears reasonably possible and appropriate to do so and shall be
peaceably and amicably dissolved when it is not.
6. The defenses to a petition for divorce of condonation, recrimination, connivance, and collusion shall be and are hereby
abolished.

Labels are at least useful as shorthand references. Denominating the above as an "integrative" approach seems most descriptive:
the public policies reflected variously in non-fault grounds and in
conciliation statutes are here integrated into one statute; the nature
of marriage as an on-going, integrated enterprise is reflected as
well.
An integrative statute would appear on first impression to represent a broad departure from "traditional" approaches to divorce.
Given the widening development both of non-fault grounds and of
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conciliation services, however, it is no more than the next step in
the development of the policies on which each of those approaches
is based. Moreover, even within the traditional fault concept there
has developed the attitude that more than the occurrence of external events as such must be demonstrated before a divorce will
be granted. This attitude is brilliantly reflected in Justice Traynor's discussion of the defense of recrimination in DeBrugh v.
DeBrugh.91 It has been acknowledged as well by the Nebraska
Supreme Court in cases involving extreme cruelty, although it may
be questioned whether the factor is not more a standard against
which the quantum of cruelty necessary to suffice for granting the
divorce92 is measured, rather than an independent, additional criterion.
In addition, the integrative statute is not unlike certain provisions in the divorce statutes of several other countries.9 3 The
difference lies in the extent to which the court, as society's agent,
will involve itself in determining independently the claims of the
parties, the actual condition of the marriage and in prescribing a
program of reconciliation where it appears productive. The laws
of neither West Germany, Sweden, nor Switzerland provide for
court investigation,9" and Sweden stands alone among the three in
its requirement that the parties appear before a "mediator" before
the court acts on a joint petition of separation.9 5 More analogous
to these European approaches are the few incompatibility statutes
in this country. But whatever rationale may once have existed
for its use, it is now clear that attempts to incorporate an incompatibility provision into the traditionally fault-oriented statute are
bound not to succeed, for either it will be given a gloss of fault by
the courts or, if given a truly non-fault interpretation, it would
rapidly become the exclusive allegation of the petition. 6 Moreover, the policy which such provisions reflect has been supplanted
91 DeBurgh v. DeBurgh, 39 Cal. 2d 858, 250 P.2d 548 (1952).
92 See discussion supra at note 22 et seq.
93 Notable among those countries including a "breakdown" provision in
their divorce law are West Germany, Switzerland and Sweden (based
on separation). The breakdown principle in general and the West
German statute in particular are discussed in W. FRiEDmAx, LAW IN A
CHANGING SOCIETY 211 (1959); the Swiss Code is discussed in RussoTTo
AND SAlWUEL, Swiss FAILY LAw (1965); and Swedish divorce law is
discussed in Sc'MwT & STRbimOLm, LEGAL VALUES IN MODERN SWEDz 41 et seq. (1964).
94 Ibid.
95 Schmidt & Str5mholm, supra note 93, at 44.
96 Wadlington, Divorce Without Fault Without Perjury, 52 VA. L. REv.
32, 52 (1966).
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by the emerging policy, reflected in conciliation statutes, of aiding
in the preservation of the marriage.
The integrative statute does, however, possess certain unique
features. "Grounds" as such are eliminated altogether. Where
they are thought to represent a relevant condition in determining
the state of the marriage, they are specified as such (e.g., intemperance, mental illness), not as determinative of the issue but as
factors to consider. The statute also provides for an immediate investigation and hearing on the petition without any preliminary
efforts (voluntary or mandatory) at reconciliation. Consultation
with the husband and wife themselves may, of course, constitute a
part of the investigation, and such consultations would almost
necessarily include inquiry into the possibilities of a reconciliation.
But by foregoing attempts at reconciliation prior to a hearing it is
felt that feelings of ambivalence and frustration over the delay,
and attempts which will prove futile despite an apparent willingness of one or both parties will be avoided.
Finally, where after a hearing on the present state of the marriage the court declines to award a decree of dissolution, it may
only advise (based on the reports and evidence adduced at the
hearing) that the parties undertake a program of reconciliation.
Public facilities, or public funds to engage private facilities ought
to be provided to support those individuals whose finances do not
permit them feasibly to pay for such services themselves.
In light of these unique features and notwithstanding the analogies which the statute bears to law both in this and other countries, it does represent a major shift in divorce policy. As a result
it is susceptible to misunderstanding and unfavorable comment.
It would seem worthwhile, therefore, to undertake some prolepsis
concerning the proposal, together with a discussion of its advantages and potential disadvantages.
Perhaps most serious of the criticisms by those individuals who
have so far considered the integrative statute is that it is in substance divorce by consent. A fair reading of the statute as a whole
would seem to belie this conclusion. Taken as a whole, the statute is designed to create the basis for an independent judicial
determination that the marriage should be dissolved. The attitudes
and desires of the parties are, of course, relevant to the issue of
viability; but they are by no means conclusive of that issue. The
chickens are not considered finally to be the best judges of the
eggs; and even if they were, the public retains an interest which
ought to be protected through judgments other than those of the
parties themselves. In this sense, it may even be said that the inte-
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grative statute represents a retreat from present divorce policycertainly from present practice. It is hornbook knowledge that
most divorces granted today are consented to by both spouses, that
particularly where they are uncontested they are already a "joint
venture" of the parties.9 7 If the consent divorce is a problem,
should we not eliminate the ex parte divorce?
In all candor it must be said, however, that under the integrative statutes there would eventually come a time when most petitions seeking dissolution would be granted. This is likely to occur,
for example, as the public comes generally to recognize that isolated events are not per se sufficient to warrant granting a divorce.
This should lead to greater efforts on couples' part to adapt to the
specific conditions of their marriage, and to resort to the courts
only when an honest effort has been made at making the marriage
work. In turn the number of petitions should be reduced.
A second criticism, and one perhaps more difficult to respond
to in advance, is that the standards established in the statute are
vague and ambiguous. This is, of course, true; it is equally true of
any statute which has not yet been applied to the facts of a particular case. In fact, however, it is doubtful whether the ambiguity
of the statute would pose serious problems for a judge who, by the
time he takes the bench, certainly will be sufficiently mature and
have enough professional and personal experience to apply the
flexible standard with sufficient precision. The judge is not required, however, to limit himself to this kind of "I know it when I
see it" approach. Criteria believed to be important in aiding his
judgment are provided. Indeed, he is directed to consider them
where they are present. In addition, the court is provided with an
investigation report as a further aid to his decision. The use of
similar reports of pre-sentence investigations is required in the federal courts on criminal matters. Moreover, the use of such reports
is presently provided for in Nebraska in divorce cases where the
custody of minor children is involved. 98 The question addressed in
such investigations is not entirely dissimilar to that posed by the
integrative statute.
Legislation incorporating flexible standards is not without precedent in our law. In the juvenile courts, for example, the problem of standards has for years concerned lawyers and judges. In
97

Cantor, The Right of Divorce, 218 ATLAxTic

MONTHLY 67,
O'GoRmAN, LAWYERS AND MATRimONiAL CASES 27 (1963);

71 (1966);
Rheinstein,

Trends in Marriage and Divorce Laws of Western Countries, 18 LAw
& CONTEMP. PROB. 3, 18 (1953); Sayre, Divorce for the Unworthy: Specific Grounds for Divorce, 18 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 26, 27 (1953).
98 NEB. REv. STAT. § 42-307 (Reissue 1960).
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the present Nebraska statute dealing with neglect, a neglected child
is defined in part as "any child under the age of eighteen years...
(b) who lacks proper parentalcare by reason of the fault or habits
of his parent . . ."99 With respect to the custody, care and maintenance of minor children following a divorce, the court is granted
authority to make such "further decree as it shall deem just and
proper..
.;100 and its decree may be later amended if it appears to
be to the best interests of the children
"....
101 What constitutes
"proper parental care?"; When is a decree "just and proper," or in
the "best interests of the child?" These standards are, it is submitted, fraught with vagueness and ambiguity. Yet judges, while
admitting the difficulty of the application in many cases, nevertheless have not shied away from interpreting and applying them.
Couching the mandate to act in such terms appears to be no more
than an implicit recognition that decisions in specific cases will depend on considerably more factors and circumstances than can reasonably be expected to be incorporated in a statute. What constitutes a prescription for a child's "best interests" in one case may
well spell disaster in another. And so it is with marriage. The
Brown's may weather vicissitudes of married life that for the
Smith's would cause disintegration of the relationship.
No legislative standard is without some ambiguity. The very
fact that language is symbolic dictates this circumstance. The
amount of permissible ambiguity would seem to depend, first, on
the possible results of misapplication; second, on the likelihood of
such misapplication; and third, on the goals sought to be achieved
by the particular provision. Where the goal is important to the
social order and the results of misapplication are neither serious
nor irreversible, the possibility of some misapplication of the standard may be more tolerated than where the goal is less important
or the result of error serious. The goal that the integrative statute
reflects is that of preserving a marriage where it appears reasonably possible to do so; the result of misapplication would in most
cases mean only a temporary continuation of an unfortunate situation. The possibility of some misapplication should therefore
be condoned.
A third criticism is that judges are not competent to make such
judgments in the first place. This objection appears bottomed on a
mechanistic view of the judicial function which, if accurate, would
mean that we might immediately proceed to eliminate human judges
altogether and substitute in their place electronic computers, very
99 NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-201(3) (Supp. 1965).
(Emphasis added.)
100 NEB. REv. STAT. § 42-311 (Reissue 1960). (Emphasis added.)
101 NEB. REv. STAT. § 42-312 (Reissue 1960). (Emphasis added.)
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probably with a considerable saving to the county and state both
in time and money. 0 2 The proposal is not entirely without merit.
There are, of course, many areas of the law in which a less flexible
approach might represent some improvement. Family law has,
however, never been thought to be one of them-and for good reason. Decision-making in this area with respect both to adjudication and disposition has always been thought to require a refined
balancing of the interests of the individual and of society as a whole.
Again we may look to the juvenile courts for models.
From its inception at the turn of the century, both the proponents and opponents of a separate, treatment-oriented juvenile
court have agreed that a key figure in the system is the judge. It is
the judge who in the last analysis must apply the principles of
"individualized justice" to rehabilitate rather than punish the young
offender. Necessarily, therefore, it is the judge who must possess
an insight and understanding of the complexities of childhood and
adolescent behavior-indeed, of human behavior generally-beyond
that thought to be required of judges generally. Unfortunately,
selection of the juvenile court judge has not always been made
with such considerations in mind. To a remarkable extent, however, juvenile court judges, especially in the larger metropolitan
areas throughout the country, have been men of remarkable insight and sensitivity to their tasks. Some judges possess professional training not only in law but in one or another of the behavioral sciences (characteristically, social work) as well. Even
where they have not, however, careful judicial selection has produced a corps of judges who for the most part are prima facie
competent to fulfill their specialized role.
The specialized domestic relations judge thought to be necessary to man the suggested procedure 0 3 under the integrative approach thus is not without his paradigm in present practice. In
addition, however, increasing attention is being devoted to judicial
training. While it has more than once been said that the law
schools do better at training students to be appellate court judges
than practicing members of the bar, it is in any event true that
they do little to train students in the fine art of judgment at the
trial level. A landmark among recent efforts attempting to remof neophobia" appear to be particularly susceptible to this
view. Alexander, Introduction to ViRTuE, FAvIn.Y CASES IN CoURT at
xxxiv (1956).
Chute, Divorce and the Family Court, 18 LAW & CONTEmP. PROB. 49,
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50 (1953); Ogburn, The Role of Legal Services in Family Stability, 272
Annals 127, 131 (1950); compare Rheinstein, The Law of Divorce and
the Problem of Marriage Stability, 9 VAND. L. REV. 633, 663 (1956).
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edy this lack of training is the National College of Trial Judges.
The National Council of Juvenile Court Judges, building on the
pioneering efforts of the National College, has recently completed
a three year demonstration training program for juvenile court
judges designed to enhance their interdisciplinary skills. Care in
judicial selection coupled with provision for post-graduate training
should prove an effective combination in providing domestic relations judges competent to meet the test established in an integrative statute.
As pointed out earlier in this paper, some writers have suggested that the problem to be met in our divorce legislation is
that of a rising divorce rate which is seen as posing a threat to the
family as a fundamental social institution. The breakup of a particular family is thought also to create serious problems where
children are involved in establishing the conditions which produce delinquent conduct or emotional disturbance. It is argued
that the abolition of all grounds for divorce will render divorces
easier to obtain. Hence there will be more of them and more of the
problems they are thought to generate. The apprehension is similar to that generated by a consent divorce approach.
It ought to be sufficient answer to this argument to point out
once more that, admitting the validity of these suppositions, the
situation would under an integrative statute differ very little from
our present one. Provided one's ethics are "situational" enough,
divorce currently is not at all difficult to obtain. The argument
that the divorce rate will increase does, however, provide the
opportunity for discussing certain additional facets of the problem which deserve attention in order to advance an understanding
of the merits of the integrative approach.
The nature of the modern marriage contrasts markedly with
the marriage of one hundred or even sixty years ago. Whereas
the family at an earlier period functioned in large measure as an
economic unit with income producing roles assigned to all but its
youngest (and perhaps oldest) members, this task is today the primary (and still usually exclusive) function of the husband and
father. Additionally, this activity is today usually performed outside the home. The differential roles of husband and wife, income
production on the one hand, housekeeping and child-rearing on
the other, are thus separated both in time and place. Functions
such as food preparation, education of children, and recreation,
previously assigned the family, now are performed for the most
part outside the home. The role of the family as an economic and
social unit of society thus has diminished over what it was in the
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past. 0 4

Accompanying this shift in the family role, there has been an
increase in the impersonality of economic and social relationships
outside the home. As the size of most communities has expanded,
business and social relationships have tended to be carried on at a
less personal level. Technological advance (e.g., substitution of the
dictating machine for the secretary) has contributed to this development. The increase in leisure time available has meant less contact with business and professional associates.
These developments (there are others) are seen as dictating the
creation of new roles for the modern family-ones in which considerably more importance is attached to the fulfillment of satisfying
interpersonal needs of its members. Emphasis not so much on
what is done but how and with whom thus becomes intensified.
Particular roles within the family-the expectations placed upon
its several members-have thus become less clear. Consciously or
otherwise, they seek "satisfying" relationships with one another.
As Goode has pointed out in describing the significance of the
substitution of the independent conjugal family system for that of
the extended family of an earlier day:
This type of family system, characteristic of the West for several generations.. . requires that husband and wife obtain most of
their emotional solace within the small family unit made up of
husband, wife and children ....
The conjugal family unit causes
a heavier emotional burden when it exists independently than when
it is a small unit within a larger kin fabric. As a consequence,
this unit is relatively fragile. When husband or wife fails to find
emotional satisfaction within this unit, there are few 05
other sources
of satisfaction and few other bases for common living.

It may be expected, therefore, that the increased demands placed
upon the marriage partners will result in some increase in their
lack of attainment and hence an increase in the desire to terminate the relationship. The current divorce rate thus becomes, in
part, "an index of the new demands made upon marriage for sociability and leisure," demands which not only begin high but include the "expectation that each partner grow and develop at approximately the same rate as himself."' 0 6 It is plain, however,
104

Goode, Family Disorganization in
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(Merton & Nisbet, eds. 1961).
105 Id. at 409.
106 RIEsMAx, GLAZER &

DENNEY, THE LONELY CRoWD 320 (Anchor Abr.,
1953). It has been suggested that one reason for the higher divorce rate
of Americans compared with Australians is that the latter expect less
from their marriage. "[Tjhe Australian 'would prefer to reduce his
needs in order that they may be fulfilled.'" Day, Patterns of Divorce
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that the conditions generally established by law for the dissolution
of a marriage may be, when viewed in the total context of modern
marriage, irrelevant, incidental, or at most symptomatic of a considerably more complex underlying problem.
Another factor to be considered in evaluating the criticism of
an increasing divorce rate is the fact that while that rate itself has
increased in the last century, the rate of family dissolution as a
result of all causes has not increased. The death of a marriage
partner previously accounted for a larger proportion of marital
dissolutions. than today. Divorce today appears, therefore, only to
be accomplishing what earlier transpired in the course of natural
107
events.
In evaluating the significance of a rising divorce rate, it is also
important to distinguish between its significance for a particular
family and its significance with respect to the family as an institution. It cannot seriously be doubted that divorce for a particular
family may be a regrettable event for its members. Indeed, that
such is often the case is a major theme of this paper. On the
other hand, there seems to be no reliable evidence to support the
belief that increased divorce threatens the institutions of marriage
and the family. The rate of marriage tends to remain relatively
majority of
constant in proportion to the population; and a large
10 8
men and women who do divorce eventually remarry.
Contrary to the assumption that divorce threatens the family
as an institution is the assertion that divorce actually vindicates it.
Despite the facts that considerably greater demands are today
placed upon the marriage partner, this has not resulted in any
measurable discouraging of those even who have experienced dissatisfaction and disappointment. Marriage remains an attractive
status for most individuals. And for those who experience dis-
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in Australia and the United States, 29 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 509,
521 (1964).
Shaffer, Divorce Law Reform, 2 EDITORIAL RESEARCH REPORTS, 865, 866

(1963). Furthermore, the divorce rate appears to have been declining
since the 1950's. Ibid.
The probabilities that a divorce partner will remarry are in general
about three out of four. Davis, Statistical Perspective on Marriage and
Divorce, 272 Annals 9, 19 (1950); ERNST & LOTH, FOR BETTER OR WORSE
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satisfaction and disappointment in a particular marriage, divorce
provides an opportunity to attempt once again the achievement of
the goals available only or primarily through marriage and the
family. Divorce thus becomes a form of "social insurance" the cost
of which should not be made unreasonably high.10 9
Very little study has been made of the relationship between
divorce grounds and divorce rate. Those few inquiries that have
been made, however, indicate that there is no significant correlation
between the two phenomena. Among the leading treatments of the
subject is Wolf, Luke, and Hax's discussion of the differential impact on divorce rates of changes in the divorce laws in effect in
Germany before and after 1900.110 Prior to 1900, several different
laws were in force. In Prussia, for example, divorce was permitted
not only on the ground of "misconduct," but generally also by
marital agreement as well as on the unilateral petition of one
spouse based upon the "insuperable aversion" to the other. The
German common law prohibited altogether divorces by Catholics,
and only on grounds of adultery, cruelty, or desertion by Protestants. Under the third system, the Code Napoleon, divorce was
permitted only on grounds of cruelty, which was, however, defined
more liberally than under German common law.
Under the Civil Code of 1896 (which became effective in 1900),
"guilty misconduct" was made the exclusive grounds for divorce.
The law thus was liberalized with respect to prior German common
law and constricted with respect to the earlier Prussian Code.
Comparing the numbers of petitions for conciliation in the several
regions and the divorce rate per 100,000 population before and
after 1900, the authors conclude that the change in the law had no
significant impact either in promoting or discouraging divorce. In
fact, in some districts where the change represented a restriction of
prior law, the upward curve of divorce was even steeper than before. In 1939 the divorce law was considerably liberalized. Again,
however, there seems to have been no significant impact on the
divorce rate. Based on these findings, the authors conclude that:
The experiment made by the makers of the Civil Code refutes the

notice [sic] that a limitation of the statutory catalogues of grounds
109

Lasch, Divorce and the Family in America, 218 ATLANTIC MONTHLY 57,
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for divorce to situations of guilt could result in a reduction of the
number of divorces or even in their rate of increase. On the other
hand, the present marriage law has refuted the apprehension that
the introduction of the disruption principle [in 1938] would mate-

rially result in an increase of divorce. No causal or even statistical
connection exists in one direction or the other.111
A study 1 12 conducted by the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company
for the years 1910 to 1948 reflects similar results with respect to
divorce rates in England and Wales where, under the same law,
divorce rose from 2.2 per 1,000 marriages in 1911 to a rate of 12.9 in
1936, an increase of nearly 600 per cent. Particularly relevant
with respect to the proposals made by this writer for revision of
Nebraska divorce law is a study comparing divorces in Nebraska
for the years 1940-1950 with those of the preceding decade, 113 in
which it was found not only that divorces in the later decade had
increased by over one-third, but also that the divorce rates in Nebraska counties appear to increase in proportion to the urbanization
of the county. In a later inquiry undertaken to determine which
factors appeared to contribute most to this difference, it was concluded that the percentage of "foreign
population" and "income
114
level" were both significant variables.
While it may be an overstatement to conclude on this sparse
data that the immediate, direct and measurable influence of legislation is unimportant or imperceptible, 115 it does seem apparent
that forces other than the law itself are at work in determining the
incidence of divorce at a given time and place.
It has been suggested in this paper that the design of an integrative divorce statute is promotion of the maintenance of healthy,
viable marriages. This is in contrast to efforts at preserving marriages indiscriminately-in an approach which simply discourages
111 Quoted in Rheinstein, supra note 110, at 498.
112

(Emphasis added.)
Reported in Elliott, Divorce Legislation and Family Instability 272

Annals 134, 140 (1950).

118 Cannon, An Analysis of Divorce in Nebraska (Neb. Agriculture Experimental Station, Research Bull. No. 174, 1954).
114 Cannon & Gingles, Social Factors Related to Divorce Rates for Urban
Counties in Nebraska, 21 RURAL SOCIOLOGY 34 (1956).
115 A positive correlation between the law's '"permissiveness" and the
incidence of divorce has been suggested by one writer, but with respect
only to urban areas. BROEL-PLATERis, Associations Between Marriage
Disruption, Permissiveness of Divorce Laws, and Selected Social Variables, in CONTRIBUTIONS TO URBAN SOCIOLOGY 512, 524 (Burgess & Bogue,

eds. 1964). It has been suggested also that where divorce is easy to
obtain in one jurisdiction and more difficult in another, the cases will
accumulate in the former and "dry up" in the latter. Rheinstein, supra
note 103, at 641.

DIVORCE WITHOUT FAULT
divorce. The implication is that some marriages should be dissolved. This assertion is in need of some support. However, as
with determination of the impact of divorce statutes on divorce
rates, so also with questions involving the benefits from dissolution (or detriments from preservation) of the marriage, supporting
empirical data is scarce. There seems to be common agreement,
however, among professionals who have worked with disturbed
spouses, parents and children that many of their problems have
been caused by the failure of members of the family unit to fulfill
11 6
More esfundamental psychological needs of the individual.
of
deterioration
a
process
affairs,
of
state
present
the
in
pecially,
in the marriage extending sometimes over months or even years
precedes the eventual resort to the divorce court. Often in such
cases, the process has continued too long for it to be reversed. In
such circumstances, divorce is seen as a relief from the pathological
environment of the marriage, the healthiest course of action then
available." 7 For children of the marriage, especially, the quality of
their childhood experience is the controlling factor, not whether
they have experienced a divorce in the family." 8 And a child may
be damaged or destroyed in many ways in a bad home." 9
It is perhaps worth reiterating here what has been said above
concerning the doubtful effect of divorce on deviant conduct sub120
sequently, particularly by the children involved. In a study
analyzing a self-report questionnaire completed by 700 high school
students in grades nine through twelve to determine "whether
children are better adjusted in homes psychologically broken but
legally and physically intact compared with legally broken homes,"
the conclusion was that, as a group, the adolescents from the
broken homes demonstrated less delinquent behavior, less psychosomatic illness, and better adjustment to parents than did those
116 See, e.g., Johnson, Suppressed, Delayed, Damaging and Avoided Divorces, 18 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 72 (1953); Plant, The Psychiatrist
Views Children of Divorced Parents, 10 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 807

(1944); Sarnoff, Society with Tears (1966).
Plant, supra note 116, at 813.
118 Goode, supra note 104, at 455.
17

19 One psychiatrist has listed eleven different ways in which the child
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being raised in a pathological home environment may be emotionally
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Nye, Child Adjustment in Broken and in Unhappy, Unbroken Homes,
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from unhappy, unbroken homes. Similar conclusions were reached
with respect to the children of "solo" parents.1 2 1 Furthermore, the
adjustment (measured as satisfying "parental interaction") of parents individually and to their spouses was, for those who were
products of broken homes, superior to those spouses from unhappy,
unbroken homes.

122

Despite the fact, therefore, that the personalities of some marriage partners are such as to require a pathological balance in their
marital relationships which for normal individuals would dictate
release from the situation, 1 23 the conclusion seems inescapable that
some marriages ought to be dissolved for the benefit of all concerned. It is simply not true as a general statement that the children and spouses of a marriage are always better off remaining
together despite the quality of their relationships. The goal of
the law should therefore not be simply to preserve the marriage,
but to preserve the family. And while it is, as noted above, problematical, the impact the law has on the divorce rate as such,
there should be no cause for alarm even if it rises. Obviously,
more is at stake in considering questions of divorce than their
sheer number.
No change in law is wholly unaccompanied by uncertainty; certainly a statute such as the one herein proposed is no exception.
It is felt that the larger share of reservations, doubts, and objections have, however, been met in the foregoing discussion. Still,
no proposed change in law should be forced to depend for support
wholly on its unobjectional quality. There ought to be positive
reasons why it is to be preferred over existing law. What follows
is an attempt to enumerate some of these reasons, all of which
may properly be subsumed under the major heading "realism."
Realism, however, is an elusive concept with respect especially
to the interactive relationship between law and social behavior
generally. We are wont to believe that law exerts a force on the
conduct of the community, but the questions of how much force it
in fact exerts and under what conditions have so far defied accurate assessment. Moreover, it is unlikely that completely accurate answers to these questions may ever be given. The studies
discussed above indicate that factors other than law alone are influential in controlling and determining human behavior, but they
consider neither the extent to which the law itself is a product of
121
122
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other factors nor the interactive nature of the law and other social
conditions. It-seems, nevertheless, reasonable to assume that, "law
is instrumental in making choices and in organizing value systems.
Searches for immutable connections between legal institutions and
other cultural elements have not been successful, but the evidence
that law and
at least seems capable of supporting the conclusion
124
other cultural elements influence each other."'
In the field of sanctions law generally, we presume that proscribing certain conduct will in most situations result in its abandonment. Thus, prohibition against speeding, or driving on the
left side of the street results usually (although not always) in their
relinquishment. Such laws are obviously necessary for the orderly
flow of traffic in any volume. In addition to the results which they
achieve based on their apparent necessity, however, such rules seem
to emanate a kind of ethical quality, quite apart from and in addition to their need to achieve the primary goal for which they are
intended. 2 5 This emanation we may call "law-abidingness." It
carries an ethical quality about it similar to that which accompanies
morally as well as legally sanctioned conduct. It is that quality of
law which results in adherence to it even in the absence of necessity.
Law-abidingness as an independent referent of either prescribed or proscribed conduct results in an adherence to the rule
for its own sake. By infusing the rule with an ethical or moral
quality, a course of conduct which adheres to the rules may be
concluded to be "right" conduct. Correlatively, a violation of the
rules may be concluded to be not merely "illegal" but "wrong" as
well. Stated somewhat differently, conduct which is not determined to be "wrong" may be concluded to be "right."
Applying these generalizations to a fault-oriented divorce statute, we may reason that the non-violation of the proscriptions embodied in the several grounds for divorce will be viewed as right
conduct. Divorce grounds specify what must not be done within
the framework of the marriage. The inference is, of course, that
124 DAVIS, FosTER, JEFFERY & DAvIs, SociETY AND THE LAw 55
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the marriage is in the eyes of the law a successful one-necessary
of preservation. What may realistically be termed as the legal
minima for marital preservation thus becomes the maxima as
well-or at least insofar as the law is concerned.
The results of such a perception of marriage-viewed through
the lens of the traditional divorce statute-are not difficult to
imagine. The husband who remains faithful to his wife, avoids
beating her, and pays the bills is led to believe that his marriage
is "successful." Despite doubts which gnaw at this belief and which
may be reinforced by conflicts which emerge from time to time
within the relationship, he is permitted to continue in his belief
that his law-abidingness will emerge victorious in the end. 126 Without more, such hopes are a mere chimera. As a result, the relationship is permitted to deteriorate to the point where either legally recognized grounds occur, or the situation becomes so intolerable that grounds are created or fabricated. At this point, the
spouses make their first contact with the courts.
On the other hand, the individual who views the marriage as
a process of abiding by the rules may himself sooner or later fall
"victim" to their violation.1 27 While the isolated instance of rule
infraction (e.g., adultery) is less apt to lead to the conclusion that
the marriage is ripe for dissolution, 128 the very fact that a rule
has been violated may nevertheless so color and affect the marriage
relationship as to commence that process of deterioration which
leads ultimately to the courthouse door in the same manner as that
described above and with the same result.
Where the deterioration of the marriage has been permitted to
extend over months or years, there is very little that can be done
to rebuild it into an ongoing enterprise. Judge Paul Alexander
summed up the situation by describing his function in a divorce
suit as analogous to that of a high priced mortician presiding at
the funeral and burial of a dead marriage. 129 Where one of the
spouses seeks a divorce "merely" because one of the rules has
been broken there would seem to be more hope for resuscitation.
Yet even here the courts provide little more than judicial first aid.
126
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The integrative divorce statute is designed to deal more effectively with each of these situations. It is submitted that by eliminating the grounds for divorce as such we may hope to eliminate
the notion that marriage is a set of rules failing in the transgression of which one may be successful at it. We cannot, of course,
possibly attempt to enumerate every feature of a successful marriage relationship. We can, on the other hand, undertake to eliminate the misguided belief that success is determined by obedience
to rules and failure by the lack of it.
It is submitted further that by curing such false impressions of
the nature of marriage, we may also promote earlier resort to the
courts. Without grounds, the spouses are denied specific standards against which to measure the nature and quality of their marriage. They are reduced to relying exclusively on their own feelings. Hence, they are neither deterred from seeking judicial intervention because they lack grounds nor are they encouraged to eschew it for the same reasons. Although it may be argued that,
given the ease with which most grounds now may be "proved," the
law currently offers little deterrent, the difference under the integrative statute is seen as avoiding the lengthy period of deterioration which now usually transpires before a couple gets to court.
"Fundamentally, the change in the point of view of the court from
an instrument of punishing sin . . .to an institution for the rehabilitation of the family, should in time encourage people to bring
their family troubles voluntarily to the tribunal .. .long before
they reach the breaking point.. 130 The situation may be likened
to a patient with tuberculosis. Diagnosis and treatment are not
made to await the arrival of unbearable chest pain or blood in the
sputum. Symptoms which occur much earlier and which at that
point may be ambiguous with respect to potential pathological conditions are inquired into immediately; and if upon inquiry it is
found to be necessary, treatment is commenced promptly. Similarly, there need be no reason for a marriage to become moribund
before any action is taken.
Promoting an earlier resort to the courts should result in enhancing the prospects for rehabilitation by reaching the problem
before it becomes hopelessly impacted. Where the divorce is finally
granted, the result should also be less traumatic on all of the parties involved. This feature of an earlier resort to the courts is especially important where children are involved. Not only is the
situation less threatening to them because elimination of divorce
grounds as such spares the child the knowledge he now acquires of
130 Bradway, supra note 127, at 398.
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his parents' misdeeds; 131 but also intervention is achieved at a
time when there has been less exposure to the deteriorative factors
within the marriage. 132 Without attempting to minimize the serious consequences of divorce for young children under any system,
it should nevertheless be mentioned that what is commonly viewed
as the negative consequence of the divorce itself is usually
more
133
the result of the manner in which the divorce comes about.
The confusion which appears where the fault based divorce
statute and conciliation procedures exist side by side has been discussed above. It needs to be added here that the elimination of
grounds for divorce will prove of little value without provision
for voluntary conciliatory procedures as well. It is submitted that
this is the principal shortcoming of those statutes now in existence
which are premised on the breakdown principle. What should the
nature of the court's conciliation function be under the proposed
integrative statute?
In the original draft statute submitted by the writer to the
revision committee, it was provided that the court might order the
parties to submit to psychiatric or other counseling in cases where
a decree of dissolution was denied. The rationale for the provision
was to enhance the prospects for eliminating positively whatever
psycho-social factors underlay the original decision to seek dissolution. This feature of the integrative statute was seen as a keystone in the entire program of eliminating fault-oriented divorce.
It is now apparent that while the motives for such a provision
may be laudable, objections to its coerciveness far outweigh such
considerations.
Central in the decision to revise this aspect of the original
draft was the belief that the prospects for lasting rehabilitation of a
marriage in trouble can occur only where the parties themselves
manifest a willingness to participate in new strategies designed to
achieve that goal. This would seem particularly true where the
strategies include individual psychotherapy. Requiring the marriage partner to undergo such treatment may produce, temporarily,
positive results; but the prospects of lasting results are minimized
by the fact that the individual is provided with no real choice.
His participation in the decision-making with respect to therapeutic
alternatives is apparent only, if indeed he is permitted to participate at all. Hence his commitment to a program of relief is op131
132
1 33
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tional and minimal. On the other hand, where the proposed strategies for change rest entirely on a consensual basis, commitment to
it is enlarged and the prospects for success are enhanced. The
need, therefore, appears to be not only for the consent of the parties
to whatever programming the court and its aides may develop for
rehabilitating a particular marriage but participation in the development of the program as well. What has been said with respect to
change in a correctional setting seems equally appropriate in this
context:
. . [It
[ is doubtful that] any single person can be totally responsible for a program of change which affects others if it is to be effective. If the needs of both change agents, as individuals, as well
as agents of the organization, and changes are equally important
determinants of the direction and success of attempted change,
ultimately the responsibility for change needs to be shared as well.
It should be stressed that the principle of shared responsibility is
applicable to a greater or lesser degree to all phases of activity,
but it is particularly important to those areas in which the internalization of new attitudes
and behaviors on the part of changes is
34
especially valued.'
In the context of the divorce court such an approach necessarily
implies participation in the process by both spouses. Where minor
children are involved consideration should be given to including
them also, depending on their maturity.
In a thoughtful and perceptive article,13 5 Professor Rheinstein
has raised some serious doubts and objections to the therapeutic
approach to marital problems in a judicial setting. He stresses the
fact that most proposed programs include a compulsion factor
which, as indicated above, may produce only temporary hoped for
results. Moreover, most such proposals imply a requirement that
the individual submit to deep personality analysis, even personality
change. Such approaches contradict the principles of freedom and
integrity of the individual which are basic to a democratic society.
These objections would seem to be overcome by eliminating the
compulsory features of the proposed integrative statute. Furthermore, where the marital disharmony appears to spring from deepseated personality factors, it is doubtful whether any emphasis
ought to be placed on their treatment other than perhaps suggesting to the individual their need for attention. Certainly it would
be an unwarranted extension of judicial discretion to base decisions as to whether a marriage ought to be dissolved on whether
134 Hall & Williams, The Correctional Worker as an Agent of Change 6
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or not the individual has sought or undergone such treatment. 13
On the other hand, that therapy in the form of counseling which
undertakes to move the parties toward a better understanding of
themselves and each other need not involve this "lengthy and delicate probing of . . . [the] personality .... ,,137 If it is concluded
that a significant number of divorces arise primarily from misunderstandings and misapprehensions brought about because of a
lack of objectivity in the situation, then it would seem worthwhile
to attempt therapy at this level. Indeed, Professor Rheinstein suggests the use of marriage counseling, both public and private, in
cases where "difficulties have appeared to arise, in which no separation has as yet occurred, and in which both parties are in some
11s
measure willing to maintain their relationship ....
It is open to debate whether such counseling should be provided by a court connected facility or by a public or private agency
elsewhere in the community. Certainly it is true that some communities are better equipped to provide such services than are
other, smaller ones. Where no other agency exists, it seems reasonable to suggest that it be placed under the aegis of the court.
Even where other facilities do exist, however, a court connected
facility may be warranted to serve as a referral agent for the
parties and to provide reserve support for other agencies to insure
against the development of time lags in processing cases. A court
based facility has also the advantage of providing the authoritarian
framework which may be needed to achieve positive results in some
situations. 139 Since the integrative statute provides the court with
a social investigation capability, this function might easily be combined with that of counseling.
Whenever counseling and conciliation services are provided,
however, it is important to keep in mind that resort to them arises
under the integrative statute only after an investigation and hearing
on the merits of the petition. The parties have thus been accorded
1386 It has been proposed that, preliminary to petitioning for a divorce, a

party file a notice of intention to divorce, after which no petition for
divorce could be filed for six months. During the interim period, the
parties would be required to undergo "guided reconciliation." Keller,
187

138
'39

Terminating a Marriage in Nebraska, 43 NEB. L. REv. 156, 173 (1963).
Rheinstein, supra note 135, at 663.

Id. at 661.
It has been suggested that the judge should have no part in the conciliation effort. Ogburn, The Role of Legal Services in Family Stability,

272 Annals 127, 131 (1950). Certainly this is unobjectionable with respect to whatever counseling takes place. As to the development of
a counseling program, however, the judge is, in the writer's opinion,
the central figure.
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their "day in court" in a hearing which is based on all the facts and
circumstances of the marriage. Only then, it is submitted, can reasonable judgments be made on the prospects for conciliation and
rehabilitation. Only then can we expect the parties to willingly
undertake whatever change may be necessary to help their marriage to succeed.
Finally, the comparative advantages of the integrative statute
over its leading non-fault competitors, separation and consent divorce, should be mentioned. A separation provision, of course,
foregoes any attempt at reconciling the parties. Even where court
connected conciliation facilities are provided and their services imposed on the parties, there seems to be little prospect of succeeding
with individuals who already have established living patterns independently of one another. 140 In addition, the separation provision is
available only to those who can financially afford to maintain two
households. In this respect it is not unlike the availability of the
migratory divorce. This excludes the lower income families among
whom it appears that marital problems are more prevalent than
among middle and higher income groups. 141 The separation statute
is therefore practically unavailable to those for whom the likelihood of its need is greatest.
The argument that the separation is objective, confirmatory
evidence of a marital breakdown 42 is persuasive only to the extent
that one is able to overlook the rather obvious fact that the separation itself may cause and certainly does promote the breakdown.
And the response, to those who object that separation is no more
than a form of consent divorce, 4 3 that in any event it is no worse
than the consent divorces we now have in fact, 44 evidences a kind
of resigned attitude that the most we may hope to accomplish is
to render divorce more honest. Honesty is, of course, the best policy
but certainly not the only consideration where questions of family
dissolution are raised. The question is not whether the present
Foster, An "Honest Ground" for Divorce in Pennsylvania, 34 PA. BAR
Ass'x 2, 646, 649 (1963). In Sweden, it appears that a substantial
number of separated couples are reconciled as a result of the requirement that, before a judicial separation is granted one spouse against
the wishes of the other, the plaintiff must demonstrate his willingness
to accept the services of a mediator. ScmVIDT & STE5mHoLMvr, LEGAL
VALUES IN MODERN SWEDEN 44 (1964).
141 O'GoRMAx, LAWYERS AND MKATRIMONIAL CASES 22 (1963).
142 Foster, supra note 140, at 649; McCurdy, Divorce-A Suggested Approach with ParticularReference to Dissolution for Living Separate
and Apart, 9 VAND. L. REV. 685 (1956).
143 E.g., Rutman, Departurefrom Fault, 1 FAMILY LAw 181, 192 (1961).
144 Foster, supra note 140, at 650.
140
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sham should be eliminated; to this the positive response is virtually unanimous, and if this were the only question, consent divorce would be the only logical answer. But the question is, rather,
how to eliminate the sham while at the same time protecting and
promoting society's interest in the family, an interest which is difficult to protect
where divorce either by consent or separation is
145
permitted.
V.

CONCLUSION

This paper has undertaken to consider the nature of our present divorce laws, the problems which they are seen as creating (or
ignoring), and how these problems might more effectively be dealt
with through the law. Our present law is seen as irrelevant in
light of the realities of marriage, harmful in the methodologies it
employs for curing marital ills, and as encouraging divorce in
some instances and promoting popular unrealism as to the nature
of marriage in others. Positioned against this current situation is
one model for improvement. The assumptions have been that the
family unit is an institution basic to our society, that the quality of
the marriage relationship is in turn vital to the maintenance of
effective family units, and that withal the social system generally
has an abiding interest which it may promote through its law.

It may be, of course, that our present legal strategies for dealing with marital problems are
that any attempt at reform is
Certainly there is evidence to
public attitudes toward divorce
tudes toward divorce law itself

so deeply rooted in our social soil
1 46
a dangerous exercise in futility.
support the conclusion that while
may have grown more liberal, attihave remained conservative. 147 We

may be encouraged, however, by Justice Cardozo's precept that,
"the final cause of law is the welfare of society. The rule that
misses its aim cannot permanently justify its existence";1 48 and by
his admonition therefore to "remake the molds," to "seek a concep145

It has been argued that since we don't regulate marriage we shouldn't

regulate divorce. Cantor, The Right of Divorce, 218 ATLANTC MONTHLY
67, 68 (1966). The answer is that we do regulate marriage.
146 See ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 64 (Gateway ed., 1954).
147

O'Gorman, supra note 141, at 18. On the other hand, it has been argued
that the public ". . . are likely to less give weight to the desire that
the law be consistent with the past . . .and are more likely to feel
that the law should be consistent with the views gained as a result of
their own personal experience ...." COHEN, ROBESON, AND BATES,

PARENTAL AUTHORITY: THE COMMUNITY AND THE LAW 195 (1958).
148 CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 66 (Yale Paperbound

ed., 1960). Cardozo was referring to the judicial role, but the remark
seems apt as well to statute law.
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tion of law which realism can accept as true."'1 49 Surely, the final
cause of family law must be the welfare of the family in society.
A divorce law which misses this aim can no longer justify its existence.

149

Id. at 127.

